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Abstract 
Corruption is a serious problem which has many negative impacts on sustainable 
economic development globally. The clandestine nature of corruption makes it 
difficult to detect. Hence, efforts to combat corruption successfully demand 
comprehensive anti-corruption legislation, strong powers, as well as special 
investigative techniques and strategies. 
 
An effective anti-corruption regime requires a comprehensive anti-corruption legal 
framework which not only punishes all forms of corruption but also capacitates 
anti-corruption institutions. A strong anti-corruption agency is a crucial requirement 
and a necessary part of a country’s anti-corruption strategy. The failure or the success 
of an anti-corruption agency depends on a variety of factors, such as powers and 
means to detect, investigate and prosecute corruption and related offences. The lack of 
trained staff, as well as the lack of adequate material resources, also affects the 
effectiveness of an anti-corruption agency.  
 
The anti-corruption agencies covered by this research are not empowered or resourced 
sufficiently, which may result in their ineffectiveness. This paper provides a set of 
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recommendations in respect of the powers and strategies needed for a successful 
anti-corruption agency.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Corruption is a complex problem which exists in all countries, regardless of whether 
they are developed or not, and it has a negative impact on the economic and social 
development of those countries. Corruption undermines good governance, the quality 
of public infrastructure, education and health services, and affects negatively capital 
growth. It reduces the effectiveness of foreign investment and increases inequality and 
poverty in the society. Corruption makes it difficult for poor people to obtain good 
public services.1 
    
In general, corruption is a crime which affects the international community. 
Therefore, effort from every state is needed in order to fight it. In this regard, the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) requires states parties to 
establish and maintain an anti-corruption body or bodies designed to combat 
corruption.2  
                                                            
1  Parliamentary Centre and World Bank Institute (2000: 29).  
2 Article 6 of UNCAC. 
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In Africa, corruption has been recognised as a systemic phenomenon which affects all 
sectors of society, including individuals, parties, public administration and private 
economy.3 In African states, corruption is ranked among the three top national 
problems, besides poverty and unemployment, which undermine economic 
development.4 Corruption is secret and of widespread effect. It is not easy to detect. 
Hence, efforts to combat corruption, in order to be victorious, demand strong powers, 
as well as special investigative techniques and strategies.  
 
Most African countries are paying attention to the problem of corruption and looking 
for the best measures to address it. To this end, many countries have established 
anti-corruption agencies. Some examples are the Kenyan Anti-Corruption 
Commission, the Independent Commission against Corruption in Mauritius, the 
Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime in Botswana, the Office of the 
Ombudsman of Rwanda, the Anti-Corruption Bureau in Malawi, and the 
Anti-Corruption Commission in Sierra Leone. This work will focus on the 
anti-corruption agencies in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Malawi. 
 
                                                            
3 Eser and Kubiciel (2005: 13). 
4 UN Economic Commission for Africa (2009: 1). 
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Before 1994, the government of Rwanda had been characterised by corrupt practices, 
such as embezzlement of public funds and fraud in the procurement process, despite 
the existence of the penal code of 1977 which punished the crime of corruption. 
However, since 1994, when the new government took power, the political will to 
combat corruption has prevailed. As a result, an anti-corruption law was adopted and 
an anti-corruption agency was established. The Rwandan parliament adopted the Law 
on Prevention and Suppression of Corruption in 2003, and in 2004 the Office of the 
Ombudsman of Rwanda was established with the mandate to prevent and curb 
injustice, corruption and related offences in both public and private institutions. 
 
Correspondingly, in Sierra Leone, after the return to democracy in 1996, corruption 
was seen as a barrier to the economic development of the country and therefore an 
Anti-Corruption Commission was established with the promulgation of the 
Anti-Corruption Act of 2000, which gave the commission its legal existence. The Act 
was amended in 2008. Under this act, the Commission has been tasked to investigate 
and prosecute corrupt practices in the public and private sectors. 
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In Malawi, with the commitment of the state to combat corruption, the Malawian 
Anti-Corruption Bureau was established under an act of parliament called the Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1995. The Act was amended in 2004. The Bureau was established as 
the lead institution in promoting accountability and transparency in the conduct of 
government business and fighting corrupt practices in the public sector. 
 
In those three countries, anti-corruption laws and agencies have been established in 
order to curb corruption and to reduce opportunities for corruption in the public and 
private sectors. This research focuses on the different strategies and powers of these 
anti-corruption agencies in order to identify the requirements of a successful 
anti-corruption programme. 
  
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem 
As noted above, the anti-corruption agencies in question use different strategies and 
are empowered differently. For instance, the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption 
Commission can arrest without a warrant, whereas the agencies in the other two 
countries cannot. Unlike Malawi and Sierra Leone, the Rwandan anti-corruption 
agency does not have prosecutorial powers. As a way of preventing corruption, the 
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agencies in Rwanda and Sierra Leone rely upon the declaration of assets, but the 
Malawian Anti-Corruption Bureau does not use it. Moreover, unlike Malawi and 
Sierra Leone, the Rwandan anti-corruption agency does not have enforcement powers 
and powers to take legally binding decisions (during the period of seeking information 
and of implementing recommendations).  
 
Therefore, the questions to be examined in this research paper include the following: 
- What are the powers and strategies required for an anti-corruption agency to 
combat corruption effectively? 
- How can an anti-corruption agency be successful in the absence of enforcement 
powers? 
- Is the declaration of assets a useful weapon in preventing corruption?  
This research paper will also compare and contrast the anti-corruption strategies and 
investigative techniques in the three countries in an effort to identify which methods 
can be effective to combat corruption in African society. 
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1.3 Objectives of the Research 
The main objectives of this research paper are: 
- to identify the powers, techniques and strategies needed to make anti-corruption 
agencies effective in the fight against corruption in Africa ; 
- to provide recommendations for strengthening the fight against corruption in 
Africa. 
 
1.4 Significance of the Research 
Africa, like the rest of the world, is confronting difficulties in combating corruption. It 
is hoped that this study will be helpful in establishing policy guidelines for effective 
anti-corruption agencies. This research paper, in its comparative aspect, may 
contribute to the enhanced functioning of the anti-corruption agencies in Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone and Malawi. It may also contribute to the modification of laws 
governing those institutions, with a view to strengthening their effectiveness. 
 
1.5 Literature Review 
Many countries have criminal laws penalising and punishing corruption. Several 
articles and books have been written on corruption, its causes, types, and 
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consequences and on strategies which can be used to prevent corruption. However, 
there has not been enough literature on the anti-corruption agencies in Africa.   
 
The following are some examples of literature on corruption in Rwanda, Sierra Leone 
and Malawi. Mustafa’s article focuses on the role of the Anti-Corruption Bureau in 
Malawi and evaluates the major structures and measures put in place to combat 
corruption.5 Nampota’s paper on the Malawi anti-corruption agency concentrates on 
the four strategies that the agency uses in combating corruption, namely, 
investigation, prosecution, prevention and public education.6 The article by Anders, 
on civil servants and corruption in Malawi, focuses on corruption in the public office 
and the private sphere in different regions of the country.7  
 
Transparency International has produced an overview of corruption in Rwanda which 
focuses on the extent and types of corruption in Rwanda and the efforts of 
government to combat corruption.8 
                                                            
5 Mustafa (2005). 
6 Nampota (2008).   
7 Anders (2002). 
8 Transparency International (2008). 
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The Government of Sierra Leone established a National Anti-Corruption Strategy in 
2005, which examined corruption and its causes, and provided a comprehensive 
national programme to combat corruption.  
 
Although these works are generally useful, they are all specific to one country and 
lack a comparative dimension. 
 
Melissa discusses anti-corruption commissions with a focus on their important role in 
promoting citizen participation in the fight against corruption, and in this manner 
serving as an important means of regaining public confidence in government, and 
changing cultural perceptions towards corruption and towards the rule of law.9 
Melissa wrote a second paper which identifies the various models and factors that 
may make anti-corruption commissions effective in African society.10 Those papers 
address anti-corruption commissions in general, but they do not compare their powers 
and strategies in combating corruption. 
 
                                                            
9 Melissa (2009a). 
10 Melissa (2009b). 
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Spector deals with fighting corruption in developing countries.11 However, the book 
is limited to strategies of combating corruption in different sectors of society. It does 
not contain any significant material on the anti-corruption agencies. The global effort 
to combat corruption in Africa is discussed by Mbaku, but he does not examine any 
anti-corruption agency.12      
 
The anti-corruption agencies are new and, as is evident, there is little literature on 
them. To date, there has not been a comparative study of the anti-corruption agencies 
in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Malawi. This research paper is a useful complement to 
the existing publications, especially on strategies and powers needed to combat 
corruption in Africa. 
 
1.6 Scope of the Research 
This research paper is limited to a comparative analysis of the laws, the strategies and 
powers being used by the anti-corruption agencies of Rwanda, Sierra Leone and 
Malawi. 
                                                            
11 Spector (2005). 
12 Mbaku (2007). 
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1.7 Research Methodology 
This study focuses on the analysis of relevant primary and secondary materials. It 
adopts a conventional ‘law library’ research methodology. It includes legislation on 
the subject from the countries of study, as well as books, articles, academic papers 
and reports on corruption. Internet sources have been consulted frequently.  
 
1.8 Chapter Outlines 
This paper contains three further chapters: 
- The second chapter focuses on the legislative and institutional anti-corruption 
framework in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Malawi. In this chapter, the concept of 
corruption is explored in relation to laws being used by the aforementioned 
countries; 
- The third chapter analyses critically the powers and strategies employed to combat 
corruption in those three countries; 
- The fourth and last chapter makes recommendations and concludes the research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION  
FRAMEWORK 
This chapter focuses on the legislative and the institutional anti-corruption framework 
in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Malawi. Although corruption is not the substantive part 
of this work, anti-corruption agencies in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and in Malawi cannot 
be discussed without analysing the concept of corruption in relation to laws in force in 
those countries and the consequences of corruption in African society. Therefore, it is 
appropriate that this chapter starts with a short presentation on corruption and 
continues with the legal and institutional anti-corruption frameworks.  
 
2.1 The Concept of Corruption 
In order to be able to analyse the powers and strategies of anti-corruption agencies, it 
is necessary to understand the concept of corruption, its forms, causes and costs in 
African society.  
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2.1.1 Definition of Corruption 
Corruption is a multifaceted phenomenon that is difficult to define. The difficulty of 
finding a single comprehensive definition of corruption derives from the complexity 
of the concept itself.13 Corruption has been interpreted by many scholars, and has 
been given different meanings. However, those scholars have not yet reached a 
universally accepted definition of corruption. Its definition varies from country to 
country and remains largely contextual.14  
 
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), which is the one 
global anti-corruption instrument, does not define corruption. It adopts a descriptive 
approach, encompassing a variety of forms of corruption. It includes bribery in public 
sector, embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public 
official, trading in influence, abuse of function, illicit enrichment, bribery in the 
private sector, embezzlement of property in the private sector, laundering of proceeds 
of crime, concealment and obstruction of justice.15 Anti-corruption laws in all the 
                                                            
13 World Bank (1997: 8). 
14 Gould (1991: 467).  
15 Articles 14-25 of UNCAC. 
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countries under discussion do not define corruption. They have adopted a similar 
approach to UNCAC, specifying various forms of corruption.   
 
Even if it may be hard to define corruption precisely, it is generally easy to recognise 
it. The World Bank defines corruption as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’. 
This definition was chosen because it includes most types of corruption that the Bank 
encounters.16 Transparency International defines corruption as ‘the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain’.17 This definition is more precise and covers corruption in 
both public and private sectors. However, frequently more attention is given to 
corruption in the public sector. 
 
2.1.2 Forms of Corruption 
Corruption can take a variety of forms. Different classifications have been made. 
They include corruption that may occur when a bribe is paid to or sought by public 
officials for performing their legal duties or for committing illegal acts. Moreover, the 
difference has been established between corruption at the national level and those 
                                                            
16 World Bank (1997: 8). 
17 Transparency International, available at 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq#faqcorr1 [accessed on 6 May 2010].   
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forms of corruption with international dimensions. Distinctions are made also 
between petty corruption and grand corruption.18 In addition, passive and active 
corruption, embezzlement and fraud, extortion, favouritism and nepotism are 
considered to be the most commonly known forms of corruption highlighted by the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).19   
 
All these forms of corruption, as well as the corresponding penalties, are detailed in 
the Rwandan, Sierra Leonean and Malawian anti-corruption laws.20 However, in 
Rwanda, favouritism and nepotism are considered as offences related to corruption, 
not as corruption itself.21 
 
2.1.3 Causes of Corruption 
There is no agreement on the causes of corruption. They vary from country to 
country. The World Bank states that the causes of corruption ‘are always contextual, 
rooted in a country’s policies, bureaucratic traditions, political development, and 
                                                            
18 Parliament Centre and World Bank Institute (2000: 21). 
19 UNODC (2004: 10-15).  
20 See sections 26-52 of the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act of 2008; sections 24-36 of Corrupt 
Practices Act of Malawi of 2004; articles 10-16 of Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law no. 23/2003. 
21 Article 22 of the Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law no. 23/2003.  
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social history’.22 Usually, opportunities for corruption exist where public officials 
have a monopoly of power and wide discretion in performing their functions, and are 
not accountable for their actions.23 This idea is emphasised by Klitgaard in the 
following equation: C = R + D – A, where C refers to Corruption, R to Economic 
Rent, D to Discretionary Power and A to Accountability.24 
 
Moreover, corruption arises where there are no effective mechanisms of detecting and 
punishing it. It also arises whenever the salaries of and incentives for public officials 
are low.25 However, corruption occurs even among officials who are well paid. Such 
officials usually resort to corruption as a means of maintaining their status and mode 
of life.26 In many societies, there are cultural practices that are conducive to 
corruption, such as the culture of appreciation for help given.27  
 
                                                            
22 World Bank (1997: 12). 
23 Morgan (1998: 13). 
24 Klitgaad (1998: 75) cited in Myint (2000: 39).  
25 Center for Democracy and Governance (1999: 7).  
26 Mustafa (2005: 94). 
27 In Sierra Leone, for instance, the culture of collective contribution to entertain important guests can be 
used to charge illegal taxes by the local leaders. Also, the culture of ‘shaking hands’ or the ‘token gifts’ 
during the meeting may lead to misuse. See National Anti-Corruption Strategy of Sierra Leone (2005: 
13). In Malawi, the culture of rendering service to a relative and gift giving as an expression of 
kindness contribute towards nepotism and favoritism. See Mustafa (2005: 95).   
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2.1.4 Consequences of Corruption 
Corruption has many severe negative effects on economic growth, service delivery, 
investment and sustainable development. It weakens the delivery of basic public 
services, resulting in fundamental human rights, usually of the poor (such as the right 
to fair treatment), being infringed.28 Due to their powerlessness and inability to pay 
the price of corruption, poor people cannot obtain the services they need and thus 
their rights are violated.   
 
Corruption also undermines legitimacy, equality and democratic values. It encourages 
bad governance through the violation of the rule of law, accountability and 
transparency.29 
 
Moreover, corruption increases the cost of doing business, undermines public 
resources, and thus radically reduces revenues accumulated by the state. Corruption 
also expands poverty and makes it difficult for ordinary people to get ahead on their 
                                                            
28 Bryan, p8. Available at www.tearfund.org/webdocs, accessed on 10 May 2010. 
29 Abubakar (2006: 8). 
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own efforts.30 Particularly, corruption undermines the economic growth of a country. 
For instance, it has been estimated that Malawi loses one third of its annual revenues, 
and in the last 15 years it lost MK 10 billion, through corrupt practices.31 Corruption 
also leads to high expenses for government. In a corrupt country, the quality of public 
infrastructure usually is low, requiring continuous repair, and this may result in 
adverse budgetary and monetary consequences.32    
 
In sum, corruption is a serious problem which has many adverse effects on the 
economic growth of a country and the well-being of society. If not curbed, corruption 
can lead to the collapse of the state. The sections which follow address the laws and 
institutions set up in order to deal with corruption in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and 
Malawi. 
 
                                                            
30 Gbeng (2007: 4). As an example, Sierra Leone is a country rich in diamonds and gold but due to the 
culture of systematic corruption of the former governments, the economic growth of the country has 
been undermined and thus the country is placed among the poorest countries of the world. For more 
information see Bryan (10-11) available at www.tearfund.org/webdocs, accessed on 10 May 2010.  
31 Mustafa (2005: 93). 
32 Parliamentary Centre and World Bank Institute (2000: 28). See also Vito and Hamid (1997: 8). 
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2.2 Anti-Corruption Legal Framework 
In this section a number of international and regional anti-corruption instruments and 
the anti-corruption laws of Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Malawi are discussed.  
 
2.2.1 International and Regional Anti-Corruption Instruments  
UNCAC is the first global anti-corruption document which helps countries to fight 
corruption in the private and public sectors. It was adopted formally in 2003.33 The 
Convention entered into force in 2005. Its objectives are to prevent and combat 
corruption by promoting and strengthening international co-operation, integrity, 
accountability and good management of public property.34 The Convention rests on 
four main pillars: prevention, criminalisation, international co-operation and technical 
assistance, and asset recovery. The Convention covers both the private and public 
sectors. In its preventive measures, it requires states parties to develop anti-corruption 
policies and to ensure the existence of an agency or agencies, independent and 
specialised, to implement those policies.35 Moreover, every state party to the 
Convention is required to take the necessary measures, including legislative and 
                                                            
33 UN General Assembly Resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003. 
34 Article 1 of UNCAC. 
35 Articles 5 and 6 of UNCAC. 
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administrative measures, to ensure the implementation of its obligations under the 
Convention.36  
 
The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AU 
Convention) is a regional instrument which was adopted in 2003 and which entered 
into force in 2006. Like UNCAC, the AU Convention aims at preventing, punishing, 
and detecting corruption in both the public and private sectors, and promoting 
international cooperation.37 The states parties undertake to combat corruption by 
ensuring transparency and accountability in public affairs. Under this Convention, the 
states parties are obliged to adopt legislative measures to establish national 
anti-corruption authorities or agencies.38     
 
The Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption (SADC 
Protocol) is the regional anti-corruption instrument which was adopted by the heads 
                                                            
36 Article 65(1) of UNCAC. 
37 Article 2 of the AU Convention. 
38 Article 5 of the AU Convention. 
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of states and government members of SADC in 2001.39 It became operational in July 
2005. The SADC Protocol is structured similarly to the other anti-corruption 
instruments discussed above. It has the same objectives. It contains many provisions 
which mainly focus on preventive measures, criminal offences, international 
co-operation, proceeds of crime and monitoring.  Signatories to the SADC Protocol 
undertake to create institutions responsible for preventing, detecting, punishing and 
eradicating corruption.40  
 
The Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight against 
Corruption (ECOWAS Protocol) was adopted by states parties in 2001.41 However, 
the Protocol has not yet entered into force because the required number of 
ratifications has not yet been reached.42 Its objectives include promoting the 
development of effective anti-corruption mechanisms, increasing co-operation 
between states and promoting the harmonisation and co-ordination of national 
                                                            
39 The SADC Protocol was signed by all members of SADC: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
40 Article 4(1)(g) of the SADC Protocol. 
41 ECOWAS members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
42 The entry into force of the Protocol depends on its ratification by at least 9 member states (Article 22 
of the ECOWAS Protocol).  
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anti-corruption laws and policies.43 The ECOWAS Protocol, like the instruments 
mentioned above, requires states parties to establish independent and specialised 
anti-corruption agencies.44  
 
All the anti-corruption instruments noted above require states parties to establish 
anti-corruption preventive measures, including the adoption of anti-corruption laws 
and the establishment of independent anti-corruption agencies. This requirement 
emphasises the crucial role of anti-corruption agencies in preventing and combating 
corruption. The following sections focus on the national anti-corruption legislation of 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Malawi. 
 
2.2.2 National Anti-Corruption Legal Framework of Rwanda 
The fight against corruption in Rwanda is a governmental priority. The political will 
to combat corruption has been demonstrated by a number of anti-corruption policies 
and measures focusing on the establishment and strengthening of an anti-corruption 
legal framework.45 Moreover, in 2004 the government of Rwanda ratified the AU 
                                                            
43 Article 2 of the ECOWAS Protocol. 
44 Articles 5-15 of the ECOWAS Protocol. 
45 Marie (2008: 4). 
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Convention, and in 2006 it ratified UNCAC. In order to combat corruption effectively 
in the country, several laws and regulations have been put in place.  
 
Rwanda adopted a Penal Code in 1977, which, inter alia, punishes the crime of 
corruption. In its provisions, only passive corruption committed by public officials 
and magistrates or judges is punishable. It includes the practices of soliciting, 
receiving and accepting any profit by public officials in order to carry out their duties, 
to refuse to do their functions or to perform illegal acts. It punishes also the 
embezzlement of public funds.46 However, corruption in the private sector and active 
corruption are not addressed by the Penal Code.  
 
To complement the provisions of the 1977 Penal Code, in 2003 the Parliament of 
Rwanda enacted Law no. 23/2003 of 15 August 2003, aimed at preventing, 
suppressing and punishing corruption and related offences in the private and public 
sectors. This law does not define corruption but it identifies preventive measures, 
corrupt practices which are grouped into passive and active corruption, offences 
related to corruption and corresponding penalties. 
                                                            
46 Articles 220-227 of Penal Code of Rwanda of 1977. 
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This law requires public and private institutions and international organisations 
operating in Rwanda to set up mechanisms for preventing corruption and related 
offences. They must have a procedural manual, a code of conduct, an internal audit 
department and ensure equal treatment of those who seek services. Furthermore, the 
press is under obligation to become involved in the prevention of corruption by 
publicising any act of corruption and related offences.47     
 
The law distinguishes between active and passive corruption. Passive corruption 
includes any act by any person who has explicitly or implicitly solicited, indirectly or 
directly received a gift or any other profit for himself/herself or for others, or who has 
accepted the gift as a promise in order to render a service within his or her functions. 
It also includes any act committed by any person in order to accomplish an illegal act 
or to omit performing his or her duties.48  
 
Active corruption occurs when a person ‘has explicitly or implicitly offered, indirectly 
or directly proposed a gift or any other illicit profit, to a person in charge of a 
                                                            
47 Articles 3-9 of the Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law no. 23/2003. 
48 Articles 10-13 of the Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law no. 23/2003. 
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function, mission or mandate or has promised the gift or any illegal benefit in order to 
provide him or her or somebody else a service within his or her functions’.49 That gift 
or unlawful profit may be offered also in order for the targeted person to deliver an 
illegitimate service or to omit carrying out his or her usual duties.  
From the above, it is clear that passive corruption is committed by the person in 
charge of a function, whereas active corruption is committed by anybody else.  
 
The acts of demanding, receiving in excess of what is provided by the law, exempting 
from tax or non-taxation, giving away public property for free or at a very low price 
by a public agent, trading in influence, laundering the proceed of corruption, 
favouritism and nepotism, illicit enrichment, and seeking of benefits by employees 
from activities outside their responsibilities are considered all to be and are punishable 
as offences related to corruption under the Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law.50    
 
The law contains also a provision on the collection of evidence, protection of 
witnesses and the liability of legal entities. It provides penalties for each corrupt 
                                                            
49 Articles 14-16 of the Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law no. 23/2003. 
50 Articles 17-27 of the Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law no. 23/2003. 
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practice and related offence. An accomplice to corruption is also punishable in 
principle.51  
 
Compared to other anti-corruption laws that will be analysed below (Malawi and 
Sierra Leone), the Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law is not detailed and does not include 
certain corrupt acts, such as embezzlement and conflict of interest. The law also does 
not have provisions concerning co-operation in corruption matters and asset recovery. 
This law needs to be amended.  
 
In addition to the Penal Code and the Anti-Corruption Law, the government of 
Rwanda has adopted laws and regulations aimed at preventing corruption in public 
affairs. For instance, Law no. 12/2007 of 27 March 2007 on public procurement was 
passed in order to limit opportunities for corruption in procurement procedures. 
Rwanda also adopted Organic Law no. 61/2008 of 10 September 2008 on Leadership 
Code of Conduct which specifies the conduct prohibited for a leader; and Law no. 12 
                                                            
51  Chapters III-V of the Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law no. 23/2003. 
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bis of 23 March 2009 on the prevention and penalisation of the crime of money 
laundering and financing terrorism.52 
 
2.2.3 National Anti-Corruption Legal Framework of Sierra Leone 
The government of Sierra Leone manifested its will to combat corruption by signing 
and ratifying UNCAC and the AU Convention. It also adopted national laws to deal 
with the prevention and punishment of corruption in the public and private sectors. 
 
In 2000, the Sierra Leonean Government enacted the Anti-Corruption Act. This Act 
provided for the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Commission, its investigative 
powers and composition, and the punishable corrupt practices.53 In 2008, this Act 
was amended by an Act which contains many detailed provisions on the functions and 
powers of the Commission, corruption offences, the declaration of assets, and 
co-operation and mutual assistance in combating corruption.54   
                                                            
52 For more details consult http://www.amategeko.net/ or 
http://www.ombudsman.gov.rw/en/legislation.php.    
53 The Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act of 2000. 
54 The Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act of 2008. 
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Unlike the Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law, the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act 
identifies and explains clearly many corrupt practices, such as corrupt acquisition of 
wealth, use of influence to obtain contracts, bid rigging, the misappropriation of 
public or donor property or funds, impeding investment, the abuse of office and 
position, and conflict of interest.55    
 
Contrary to the Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law, the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption 
Act does not contain measures that must be taken by both the private and public 
sectors in order to prevent corruption in their functioning.   
 
In addition to the Anti-Corruption Act, in 2004 the government of Sierra Leone 
enacted the Public Procurement Act with the aim of regulating and harmonizing the 
public procurement processes in the public service. Moreover, the Sierra Leonean 
Government adopted a National Anti-Corruption Strategy in 2005.  
 
                                                            
55 For more details see sections 25 and 26 of the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act of 2008.  
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2.2.4 National Anti-Corruption Legal Framework of Malawi 
After the advent of multi-party democracy in 1994, Malawi has demonstrated the will 
to combat corruption by declaring a total war on it. Thus, a number of mechanisms 
and measures have been introduced to combat corruption and to promote public 
accountability and transparency.56  
 
The Malawian Constitution, adopted in 1994, requires the government to promote the 
welfare and development of the people by adopting and implementing policies and 
legislation aimed at achieving, among other issues, public trust and good governance. 
This requirement necessitated the introduction of measures to guarantee 
accountability and transparency in public institutions.57  
 
In this regard, Malawi has ratified UNCAC, the AU Convention and the SADC 
Protocol. In 1995, the Malawian Parliament adopted a statute called the Corrupt 
Practices Act, which was amended in 2004. Also, in 2003 the Public Procurement Act 
was passed under which the Office of the Director of Public Procurement was created 
                                                            
56 Mustafa (2005: 92). 
57 Article 13 of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi of 1994. 
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to promote efficiency and transparency in the public procurement system. Malawi 
established also a National Anti-Corruption Strategy in 2008. Furthermore, a Money 
Laundering, Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist Financing Act, which was 
passed in 2006, criminalises money laundering and provides for the establishment of a 
Financial Intelligence Unit. 
 
The Malawian Penal Code criminalises active and passive corruption. It criminalises 
also extortion by public officers.58 Likewise, the Corrupt Practices Act criminalises a 
range of corrupt practices including extortion, active and passive corruption, influence 
peddling, conflict of interest and misuse of public office.59 The Corrupt Practices Act 
contains also provisions on the Anti-Corruption Bureau, its composition, powers and 
functions.60 
 
                                                            
58 Articles 90-92 of the Malawian Penal Code of 1974. These articles penalise passive and active 
corruption by punishing a public servant or any other person charged with performance of any duty 
who solicits, receives, or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain any property or benefit for 
private gain; and any person who corruptly gives, confers or procures, or promises or offers to give or 
confer, or to procure or attempt to procure, to any person employed in the public service. 
59 Part 4 of the Malawian Corrupt Practices Act of 1995. The Act was amended in 2004. 
60  Parts 2 and 3 of the Malawian Corrupt Practice Act of 2004. 
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A major factor that demonstrates the political will to combat corruption is the 
existence of effective anti-corruption laws.61 The governments of Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone and Malawi have shown that will by adopting a number of anti-corruption 
laws, as discussed above, which criminalise corruption and related offences. They 
have also ratified international, regional and sub-regional conventions and protocols 
aimed at combating corruption.  
 
A comprehensive set of anti-corruption laws is, indeed, a requirement for any country 
committed to address corruption effectively. The national anti-corruption laws 
analysed in the previous part still have gaps to be filled. Unlike Rwanda, the 
anti-corruption laws of Sierra Leone and Malawi do not contain preventive measures. 
The Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law does not include all forms of corruption. It is 
limited to active and passive corruption and to other practices which are considered as 
offences related to corruption, whereas the anti-corruption laws of Malawi and Sierra 
Leone are more detailed and include a large number of corrupt practices.    
 
                                                            
61 Parliament Centre and World Bank Institute (2000: 23).  
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UNCAC and the AU Convention make specific reference to the establishment of a 
body or bodies specialised in anti-corruption work.62 As members of these 
conventions, the governments of Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Malawi have created the 
prescribed anti-corruption agencies. Those agencies are the focus of the following 
section. 
 
2.3 Anti-Corruption Institutional Framework  
Under article 6 of UNCAC, countries are required to guarantee the existence of an 
anti-corruption agency or agencies. Moreover, in article 36, UNCAC obliges states 
parties to establish specialised bodies or persons to combat corruption. These two 
articles, although separate, create a clear obligation for states parties to ensure the 
existence of a specialised agency or agencies to prevent and combat corruption. 
Countries may choose to establish one or many specialised institutions. The African 
effort to implement anti-corruption policies and to address corruption forcefully has 
been marked by the creation of specialised agencies charged with the fight against 
corruption. They are named differently, but commonly they are dedicated to 
preventing, detecting and punishing corruption. 
                                                            
62 Articles 6-36 of UNCAC and article 20 of the AU Convention. Article 5(h) of the ECOWAS Protocol 
and article 4(1)(g) of the SADC Protocol also call for the creation of anti-corruption agencies.   
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An anti-corruption agency generally means ‘a publicly funded body of a lasting nature 
with a specific mission to fight corruption and reduce opportunities for corruption by 
means of prevention and repression strategies’.63 This concept is wide and includes 
anti-corruption agencies with repressive and preventive authority, as well as those 
with only preventive or repressive powers. It may be deduced from this definition that 
an anti-corruption agency is a public and permanent institution. 
 
The main functions that may be attributed to an anti-corruption agency, as stated in 
article 6 of UNCAC include the following: implementation of anti-corruption 
policies, oversight64 and co-ordination of implementation of anti-corruption policies, 
and increasing public awareness of corruption and disseminating knowledge about the 
prevention of corruption.  
 
According to their main functions, anti-corruption agencies may be classified into 
three models:         
- Multi-purpose agencies with law enforcement powers and preventive functions: 
                                                            
63 De Sousa (2008: 3). 
64 There are different types of oversight: intra-institutional, cross institutional, and national. For more 
details see U4 ISSUE (2009: 8). 
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This model represents anti-corruption agencies which perform preventive, 
education and investigative functions. The adoption of anti-corruption policies, 
their analysis and technical assistance are the preventive methods, which, in 
addition to monitoring and investigation, are conducted by this type of 
anti-corruption agency. 
- Law enforcement departments: This model is based on forms of specialisation in 
investigations or prosecutions or in both fields. Thus, the functions of this model 
of anti-corruption agency can be executed separately in detection and 
investigation bodies or in prosecution bodies, or can be performed by one body. 
- Exclusive preventive institutions: This model is limited to institutions that have 
one or several corruption prevention functions. These institutions do not have law 
enforcement powers.65 
 
The implementation of anti-corruption policies involves a number of public 
institutions whose overall functions are wider than corruption issues, for example, 
those in charge of public procurement, management of public finance and auditing. 
Those institutions deal partially with corruption. This section will discuss 
                                                            
65 OECD (2007: 7). 
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anti-corruption institutions, with the focus on specialised anti-corruption agencies in 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Malawi. 
 
The government of Rwanda has established many public institutions to promote 
accountability and to reduce opportunities for corruption and related offences. Those 
institutions include the Office of the Ombudsman; the Auditor-General with task of 
monitoring whether the revenues, finance and the expenditures of the government are 
in conformity with the law and regulations in place; the Rwanda Revenue Authority 
Anti-smuggling Department aiming at minimising revenue losses by deterring, 
detecting and preventing smuggling and tax evasion; and the Rwanda Public 
Procurement Authority tasked with combating corruption by ensuring transparency in 
public tenders. Unlike the Office of the Ombudsman, which functions as the principal 
actor and supervisor in combating corruption in the country as a whole, the other 
institutions have different primary tasks.66  
 
Correspondingly, the Sierra Leonean and Malawian governments have created 
multiple institutions charged with the fight against corruption. Thus, in order to build 
                                                            
66 For further information consult www.rra.gov.rw; www.oag.gov.rw and www.rppa.gov.rw.    
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and maintain transparency and trust in the public procurement system, in tax 
collection, in public finance and in administration, the government of Sierra Leone 
established the National Public Procurement Authority, the National Revenue 
Authority, the Office of Auditor-General, and the Office of the Ombudsman. In the 
same way, the government of Malawi has created the National Audit Office, the 
Malawian Revenue Authority, the Office of Director of Public Procurement, and the 
Office of the Ombudsman.  
 
In contrast to Rwanda, where the Office of the Ombudsman is considered as an 
anti-corruption agency, Sierra Leone has, apart from the Office of the Ombudsman, 
an Anti-Corruption Commission which is the leading institution in curbing corruption, 
and Malawi has an Anti-Corruption Bureau. In Rwanda, the Office of the 
Ombudsman is a hybrid institution empowered to combat injustice and corruption, 
whereas in Malawi and in Sierra Leone, the Office of the Ombudsman deals only with 
injustice and maladministration.  
 
The remainder of this section focuses on the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda, 
the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Commission and the Malawian Anti-Corruption 
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Bureau as anti-corruption agencies. It examines their legal functions, the appointment 
of their members, their independence, their mandates, their human resources and their 
reporting obligations. 
 
2.3.1 Legal Functions 
The establishment of the Office of the Ombudsman is provided for in article 182 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 2003. Its composition and functioning 
are provided for by Law no. 25/2003 of 15 August 2003 (as amended and completed 
by Law no. 17/2005 of 18 August 2005), establishing the organisation and the 
functioning of the Office of the Ombudsman. This law contains details of the 
functions and powers of the Office of the Ombudsman. The institution was initiated 
by the Constitution but established by a specific law. The Office became operational 
in 2004. 
 
The Malawian Anti-Corruption Bureau was created by the Corrupt Practices Act of 
1995, which was amended by the Corrupt Practices Act of 2004. There is no a 
specific provision in the Constitution introducing its establishment. The same is true 
of the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Commission, which was established by the 
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Anti-Corruption Act of 2000, as amended by the Anti-Corruption Act of 2008. These 
Acts lay down the organisation and the functions of anti-corruption agencies in 
Malawi and Sierra Leone. The Malawian Anti-Corruption Bureau started its 
operations in 1996, while the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Commission began its 
operations in 2000. 
 
Being constitutionally based, the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda enjoys more 
legitimacy and stability than the Anti-Corruption Bureau of Malawi and the 
Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra Leone, whose legal bases are the ordinary laws 
which can be amended or modified easily.     
 
2.3.2 Composition and Appointment 
The Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda is composed of the Chief Ombudsman and 
two Assistant Ombudsmen. The candidates are chosen by the Cabinet and the choices 
are submitted to the Senate for approval. After being approved, the candidates are 
appointed by Presidential order. The Chief Ombudsman serves a term of four years, 
while the Assistant Ombudsmen serve a term of three years each, renewable once. To 
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be eligible, the candidates are required to be honest, wise and capable.67 However, 
unlike the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act, the Ombudsman Law of Rwanda does 
not present clear and practical criteria of wisdom, capability and honesty.     
 
The Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Commission is made up of a Commissioner and 
a Deputy Commissioner, both of whom are appointed by the President and approved 
by the Parliament. The Commissioner has to be a legal practitioner with ten years’ 
experience. The Deputy Commissioner must have knowledge and experience of ten 
years in accounting, banking or any other related profession. Both of them have a 
term of five years, renewable once.68 
 
The Malawian Anti-Corruption Bureau consists of a Director and a Deputy Director. 
They are appointed by the President on terms and conditions he or she thinks fit.69 It 
is fair to say that they serve for an indeterminate period and the conditions for 
eligibility are not clearly predetermined by the law. 
  
                                                            
67 Article 1 of the Ombudsman Law no. 17/2005. 
68 Sections 3-4 of the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act of 2008. 
69 Sections 4, 5 and 7 of the Corrupt Practices Act of Malawi of 2004. 
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2.3.3 Independence 
To be independent, the anti-corruption agencies should be protected from political 
interference. The level of independence can vary according to specific conditions. 
Thus, the independence of an anti-corruption agency can be measured through its 
structural and operational autonomy, as well as its clear legal basis. The procedures 
for the appointment and removal of members of an agency can also ensure its 
independence.70  
 
The independence of the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda is guaranteed by the 
Constitution of the Republic in article 182 which stipulates that ‘the Office of the 
Ombudsman shall be an independent public Institution’. This is emphasised by article 
3 of Law no. 25/2003, in terms of which the Office is shielded from any directive 
from any other institution. Correspondingly, the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption 
Commission and Malawian Anti-Corruption Bureau enjoy autonomy and 
independence as provided for by the laws establishing them.71  
                                                            
70 OECD (2007: 6). 
71 Section 9 of the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act of 2008 states that the Anti-Corruption 
Commission shall act independently, impartially and in the public interest; section 4(3) of the Corrupt 
Practices Act of Malawi of 2004 says that the Bureau exercises its functions independently of direction 
or interference of any other person or authority.    
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The independence of these agencies is governed by the way in which their members 
are appointed. As mentioned above, the Chief Ombudsman and Assistant 
Ombudsmen of Rwanda are approved by the Senate and appointed by Presidential 
order. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner are 
appointed by the President and approved by the Parliament, and in Malawi the 
Director and Deputy Director are appointed by the President and approved by the 
Public Appointment Committee of Parliament. Their independence may be affected 
also by the way in which members of agencies may be removed from office. In 
Rwanda, the Ombudsman and Assistant Ombudsmen can be removed from office by 
the Senate when requested by the Cabinet or by one third of the members of the 
Senate. In Sierra Leone and in Malawi, members of the anti-corruption agencies can 
be removed from office by the President but all removals must be confirmed by 
Parliament.72 These procedures of appointment and removal, if respected, may 
promote transparency, and the independence of an anti-corruption agency may be 
secured. The removal procedures ensure that the representatives of these institutions 
have security of tenure. They cannot be removed from office by an executive 
decision, without such decision being analysed and approved by a legislative organ.  
                                                            
72 Article 2 of the Ombudsman Law no. 17/2005, sections 3-4 of the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act 
of 2008, and sections 5-6 of the Corrupt Practices Act of Malawi of 2004. 
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Their independence is ensured also by the fact that their representatives, such as Chief 
Ombudsman and Assistant Ombudsmen, Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, 
Director and Deputy Director and other officers, may not be sued for any decision 
taken or any act done in good faith in the fulfilment of their functions.73       
 
Generally speaking, the agencies are shielded from political interference by the fact 
that the procedures for the appointment and removal of their chief representatives 
involve different power-holders. The wording of the statutory provisions pertaining to 
their appointment and removal also provide for checks and balances. Moreover, the 
anti-corruption agencies under discussion are well placed, in the sense that they are 
permanent, separate institutions with specific mandates. Hence, the protection of their 
independence in the exercise of their duties seems to be guaranteed. However, the 
appointment by a single politician, for instance by the President without any 
determinant conditions, as it is for the Director and the Deputy Director of the 
Anti-Corruption Bureau in Malawi, would raise questions about the independence of 
that agency. Such a practice may be considered to be an opportunity for abuse where 
                                                            
73 Article 12 of the Ombudsman Law no. 17/2005, section 20 of the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act 
of 2008, and section 22 of the Corrupt Practices Act of Malawi of 2004. 
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the politician may appoint a person for his own interests, that is, an appointment 
without integrity.       
 
2.3.4 Mandates 
An independent anti-corruption agency should be vested with a clear mandate. The 
Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda is mandated to prevent and fight against 
injustice, corruption and related offences in both public and private institutions. 
Hence, the Office is required to act as a connection between those institutions and 
citizens, receive citizen’s complaints and provide possible solutions, receive annually 
the declarations of assets of high-ranking and other officials, and provide advice to the 
Cabinet and other institutions as regards reinforcement and improvement of 
anti-corruption policies. Furthermore, the Office is under an obligation to sensitise 
people about corruption, to promote good governance and to ensure the 
implementation of the leadership code of conduct.74   
 
The mandate of the Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra Leone is to take all 
measures necessary for the prevention, suppression and eradication of corruption and 
                                                            
74 Article 3 of the Ombudsman Law no. 17/2005. 
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corrupt practices in the country. Further, the Commission has a duty to investigate 
suspected corruption and corrupt practices and to prosecute them. Like the Office of 
the Ombudsman, the Commission receives complaints on corruption and declarations 
of assets, advises institutions and any person on anti-corruption procedures, and 
educates the citizens about the danger of corruption.75    
 
The Malawian Anti-Corruption Bureau was established to investigate suspected 
corrupt practices and to prosecute them, to sensitise the public about the evils of 
corruption, and to conduct all possible corruption prevention activities in public and 
private institutions. Like the anti-corruption agencies referred to above, the Bureau 
examines the practices and functioning of public bodies in order to detect 
corruption.76  
 
Unlike the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda, which is mandated to fight injustice 
and corruption, the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Commission and Malawian 
Anti-Corruption Bureau are only responsible for combating corruption and related 
                                                            
75 Section 7 of the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act of 2008. 
76 Section 10 of the Corrupt Practices Act of Malawi of 2004.  
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offences. However, the Office of the Ombudsman, unlike the Anti-Corruption 
Commission of Sierra Leone and Anti-Corruption Bureau of Malawi, can investigate 
corruption and related offences but it cannot prosecute them. The Malawian 
Anti-Corruption Bureau, contrary to the two other agencies, is not tasked to receive 
and verify the declarations of assets of public officials. 
 
2.3.5 Organisation and Human Resources    
In order to fulfil its mandate, the Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra Leone has 
arranged its work into three technical departments. The Systems and Process Review 
Department is a preventive department tasked with evaluating the practices of public 
and private institutions and providing training aimed at corruption prevention. In 
addition, the Commission has a Public Education and Outreach Department in charge 
of educating people about the dangers of corruption; and an Intelligence, 
Investigations and Prosecutions Department. Besides the three technical departments, 
the Commission also has a Department in charge of ensuring the implementation of 
the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and a Support Services Department. Each 
department is divided into different but overlapping units.77   
                                                            
77 The Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Commission website, http://www.anticorruption.gov.sl/.  
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The Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda operates in different units. It is composed 
of five operational units, namely, the Declaration of Assets Unit which receives and 
verifies the declarations of assets; the Fighting Against Corruption Special Unit, in 
charge of investigating corruption cases; the Monitoring of Interdictions and 
Incompatibilities of Senior Officials Unit, working to ensure the implementation of 
the Leadership Code of Conduct; the Preventing and Fighting Injustice Unit, in charge 
of preventing injustice by receiving and analysing complaints as well as sensitising 
citizens about their rights; the Preventing and Fighting Corruption and Related 
Offences Unit, which has the responsibility to prevent corruption by evaluating the 
functioning of public and private institutions. Besides the operational units, the Office 
also has a Finance and Administration Unit.78   
 
In the fight against corruption, the Malawian Anti-Corruption Bureau opted for four 
pillars covering prevention, education, investigation and prosecution. Therefore, apart 
from the Administration and Finance Department, the Bureau comprises four other 
operational departments. It has the Corruption Prevention Department, the Public 
Education Department, the Prosecution Department and the Investigations 
                                                            
78 The Prime Minister Order no. 18/03 of 08 April 2010 determining the Structure and the Summary of 
Job Positions for the Office of Ombudsman of Rwanda.  
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Department.79 
 
Unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is centralised, the Anti-Corruption 
Bureau of Malawi and Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra Leone have established 
branch offices. The Malawian Anti-Corruption Bureau has branch offices in Blantyre 
and Mzuzu. The Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Commission has the Bo regional 
office and the Makeni regional office.80  
 
Those offices have been established in order to help the anti-corruption agencies 
achieve their mandates of changing the minds of people and raising public awareness 
about corruption. This is the best way to facilitate the reporting of corrupt practices by 
minimising the cost and providing for adequate services at grass-roots level.     
 
Concerning staffing, every anti-corruption agency is required to ensure that its staff 
are specially trained and motivated in order effectively to carry out their duties.81 In 
promoting specialisation of their staff, the anti-corruption agencies may co-ordinate 
                                                            
79 Nampota (2008: 2). 
80 ACB, Communications Strategy (2007: 4), ACC website, http://www.anticorruption.gov.sl/ .  
81 Article 36 of UNCAC and article 20 of the AU Convention. 
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and provide the appropriate training according to the skills needed. Otherwise an 
absence of expected skills may result. For example, though their training was 
programmed, the staff of the Sierra Leone Anti-Corruption Commission lack the 
required investigative and statement-taking skills because their training was 
uncoordinated and insufficient.82 As mentioned in the annual report of 2008, the 
Commission tried to provide a number of training sessions in order to increase staff 
skills, especially for investigators, prosecutors and intelligence officers. However, the 
Commission is still in need of highly trained and skilled staff.83    
 
The problem that affects the performance of the Malawian Anti-Corruption Bureau is 
also inadequate and inappropriately trained staff. In 2004, the Bureau lost the lawyers 
it needed to prosecute corruption cases because of insufficient salary.84 In addition, 
the investigators of the Bureau lack the requisite investigative skills.85 
 
                                                            
82 Alan (2007: 256). 
83 The Annual Report of the Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra Leone (2008: 7 and 34). 
84 Mustafa (2005: 97). 
85 Kamanga (2008: 156). 
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The Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda was given investigative powers in 2009, 
but it does not have prosecutorial powers yet. Its investigators need to be trained 
adequately in order to improve their skills. Like the Anti-Corruption Bureau of 
Malawi, the annual report of 2008 of the Office showed that its lack of sufficient staff 
resulted in ineffectiveness in the accomplishment of its mandate.86 
 
The lack of investigative skills and of experience of presenting the corruption cases 
before the court may lead to the failure of a prosecution. Moreover, the lack of 
sufficient human resources in the operational arena may result in the malfunction of 
the anti-corruption agency.   
 
2.3.6 Reporting 
An anti-corruption agency has to be accountable for its actions. It is thus crucial for it 
to be answerable to its supervising organ.  
 
                                                            
86 The Annual Report of the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda (2008: 72). 
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Article 3 of the Ombudsman Law of Rwanda states that the Office of the Ombudsman 
must submit an annual activities report and plan of action to both the President and 
Parliament.87 Furthermore, article 23 of Law no. 25/2003 of 15 August 2003 provides 
that a copy of the report has to be addressed to the Supreme Court and the Cabinet. 
Likewise, under section 21 of the Corrupt Practices Act, the Anti-Corruption Bureau 
of Malawi is obliged to submit to the National Assembly, the President, and the 
Cabinet an annual report on its activities. Contrariwise, the Anti-Corruption 
Commission in Sierra Leone, as stipulated in section 19 of the Anti-Corruption Act, is 
required only to submit an annual report to the President. It also has to cause the 
submitted report to be tabled before the Parliament.   
 
The requirement that the anti-corruption agencies submit their reports to the President 
and other officials ensures accountability and transparency in all their operations. This 
is the best tool to establish and maintain public trust in the agency and prevent it from 
becoming corrupt itself. 
 
                                                            
87 The Ombudsman Law no. 17/2005 of 18 August 2005.   
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The Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Commission has established an Anti-Corruption 
Commission Advisory Board with the mission to advise and assess annually the work 
of the Commission. This oversight Board, composed of members from different 
sectors, helps the Commission to achieve its objectives efficiently and in 
transparency.88     
 
In African society, as in any other society in the world, corruption has many negative 
consequences on sustainable economic development. In order to reduce such effects, 
the effort to combat it is needed. The governments of Rwanda, Sierra Leone and 
Malawi have demonstrated that effort by passing anti-corruption laws and establishing 
independent anti-corruption agencies.  
 
The aforementioned anti-corruption agencies are autonomous institutions, which 
perform preventive, educational and investigative functions. Therefore, it is fair to say 
that they are created in form of the multi-purpose agency model89 which is normally 
identified with the Hong Kong Independent Commission against Corruption. This 
                                                            
88 Section 22 of the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act of 2008.  
89  See Section 2.3 above. 
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model combines in a single independent institution a multifaceted approach of 
education, prevention, and investigation.90 Anti-corruption agencies under this model 
perform a range of functions and they are in a good position effectively to combat 
corruption. As stipulated in the laws creating them, they are given a number of 
functions aimed at combating and preventing corruption in both public and private 
institutions.  
 
In addition to specialised skills and an obvious mandate, the anti-corruption agencies 
must have sufficient powers and use successful strategies in their anti-corruption 
functions. The powers, the strategies and the investigative techniques being used by 
anti-corruption agencies covered by this paper, as well as those needed for the 
effective anti-corruption programmes, are the focus of the next chapter.      
 
 
 
 
                                                            
90 OECD (2007: 7 and 16). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52
CHAPTER THREE 
POWERS AND STRATEGIES IN THE FIGHT AGAINSTCORRUPTION  
Corruption is a complicated problem and to combat it requires a range of strong 
strategies and powers. Therefore, it is important to consider a comprehensive set of 
measures designed to make corrupt behaviours more costly and difficult, with the 
purpose of reducing it. The main pillars recognised by the anti-corruption instruments 
referred to in Chapter Two include prevention, criminalisation, international 
co-operation, asset recovery and effective monitoring procedures. This chapter 
focuses on the powers and strategies being used by the anti-corruption agencies under 
discussion. 
 
3.1 Anti-Corruption Strategies   
Anti-corruption agencies are created with a mandate to adopt and implement 
measures to prevent and deter corruption in the country. The agencies use different 
mechanisms and strategies aimed at reducing the opportunities for corruption, 
promoting transparency in public and private affairs, and raising public awareness 
about the dangers of corruption. This section analyses the mechanisms of preventing 
corruption adopted by the anti-corruption agencies under discussion.   
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3.1.1 Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda 
The Office of the Ombudsman has, among others, the task of preventing and 
combating corruption in both public and private institutions. With regard to 
prevention, several mechanisms have been put in place. 
  
3.1.1.1 Educating the Public About Corruption 
Article 3(8) of Law no. 17/2005 of 18 August 2005, modifying and completing Law 
no. 25/2003 which established the organisation and functioning of the Office of the 
Ombudsman of Rwanda, stipulates that the Office has to ‘sensitise the population to 
refrain from corruption and other related crimes in general and to train employees 
either in public and private institutions or non-governmental organisations’. In 
carrying out this task, the Office of the Ombudsman sensitises the public through 
sign-posts and billboards, theatres, public conferences, and the publication and 
distribution of brochures and magazines. Moreover, the Office provides training for 
the public, students, journalists and local leaders, as well as opinion makers. The 
training is meant to educate people about the dangers of corruption, how to resist and 
report it, and to encourage transparency and good governance in public entities.91 
                                                            
91 The Annual Report of the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda (2008:11-18). 
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This has resulted in the creation of anti-corruption clubs in secondary schools and 
universities. The people also receive information about the Office of the Ombudsman 
and its functions through its official website and through radio programmes. 
However, radio programmes, except during anti-corruption week, are not conducted 
on regular basis.     
 
3.1.1.2 Auditing the Functioning of Public and Private Institutions     
In addition to public education, the Office of the Ombudsman evaluates and controls 
regularly the functioning of public institutions and bodies. Generally, such evaluations 
are carried out to audit the procedures and systems of institutions in order to discover 
the practices that are conducive to corruption and the structural loopholes for 
corruption. Particularly, the Office examines whether the institutions or bodies have 
developed good systems of internal control, and whether they operate in accordance 
with the laws and regulations governing them.92 In this regard, the Office of the 
Ombudsman provides recommendations to improve the functioning of the audited 
institutions and prevent corruption. Further, the Office evaluates the implementation 
                                                            
92 The Annual Report of the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda (2008: 19). Under the articles 3(6) and 
(10) of the Ombudsman Law no.17/2005, the Office is required to conduct a follow-up of how public 
and private institutions implement the policy of combating and preventing corruption and contribute to 
good governance.  
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of the recommendations given. Non-compliance with these recommendations under 
the existing law is not considered an offence and thus no criminal sanctions are 
provided. This leads to the conclusion that the Office is acting without enforcement 
powers, which can be an occasion for authorities not to take seriously the advice and 
recommendations for the improvement of their services and the prevention of 
corruption in their systems. Therefore, recommendations made by the Office of the 
Ombudsman sometimes can be taken as worthless.   
 
3.1.1.3 Assets Declarations      
Assets declarations are an important tool in the prevention of corruption by public 
officials. The Office of the Ombudsman has the legal power and authority to receive 
and verify the assets declarations of some public officials and high-ranking officials, 
including the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, members of Cabinet and 
members of Parliament.93 That mechanism is used in order to prevent and detect 
forms of corruption such as embezzlement of public funds and illicit enrichment of 
government officials. It is also a good way of establishing transparency and good 
management in public finance.  
                                                            
93 Article 3(4) of the Ombudsman Law no. 17/2005. 
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All concerned government officials are required to declare their property every year to 
the Office of Ombudsman by not later than 31 June. A person who takes up office has 
to declare his or her property within one month after the beginning of such office. A 
person who leaves office has to declare his or her property within 15 days of leaving. 
The declared assets must include the property of the spouse and children below 18 
years, and their sources.94 The assets declared are kept confidential and their contents 
are known only to the professionals in charge of receiving the declarations. They may 
be disclosed only upon a request by the President of the Supreme Court or 
Prosecutor-General, in writing, for investigative purposes.  
 
The activity of declaring assets to the Office has been successful, as shown by the 
reports of five previous years, in the sense that more than 80% of the declaration 
forms issued were completed and returned to the Office. For instance, in 2006 the 
assets were declared at 89%, in 2007 at 88% and at 91% in 2008. After receiving a 
declaration, the Office is supposed to verify whether the information contained in it 
corresponds to reality. However, in relation to verification of the declaration, the 
Office is not effective because the percentage of verifications conducted compared to 
                                                            
94 Article 4 of the Ombudsman Law no. 17/2005. 
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declarations received is too low. In 2006, verification was made at a level of only 9%, 
in 2007 at 4% and at 5% in 2008.95 This can cause the Office of the Ombudsman to 
lose its credibility, and it can be an opportunity for corrupt officials to embezzle 
public funds because they know that the verification process will take a long time.    
 
The effective declaration of assets and their verification are considered to be good 
preventive strategies and can contribute to detection of illicit enrichment or other 
forms of corruption. During the verification stage, the staff meets the owner of the 
assets declared for explanations concerning the declaration made. The person who 
fails to prove the licit origin of his or her property immediately becomes a suspect of 
illicit enrichment or of embezzlement. In such a situation, criminal proceedings have 
to be undertaken.  
 
3.1.1.4 Advising on Corruption Prevention  
As noted earlier, the Office of Ombudsman also has the task of advising public and 
private institutions on measures to prevent and combat corruption. This is performed 
through its recommendations on how to change the practices and systems that are 
                                                            
95 The Annual Report of the Office of Ombudsman of Rwanda (2008: 60). 
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conducive to corruption and related offences. Mostly, the Office provides advice to 
the Cabinet as regards the strengthening and improvement of anti-corruption 
policies.96        
 
Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman has been given the wide mandate of doing 
the follow-up in respect of laws relating to the conduct of politicians and other leaders 
in order to prevent them from becoming involved in corrupt behaviour. It also 
identifies and makes a list of persons convicted of corruption or related offences, and 
publicises it. This mechanism is a way of shaming the corrupt person and serves a 
preventive as well as a deterrent function.   
 
In summary, the law regulating the functioning of the Office of the Ombudsman 
contains strong wording on the preventive mechanisms that the Office is entitled to 
use in the fight against corruption. Its preventive mechanisms principally focus on 
educating the public about the dangers of corruption and encouraging the population 
to resist and report it. They also include the auditing of the functioning of public and 
private institutions, and the provision of corresponding recommendations. However, 
                                                            
96 Article 3(5) of the Ombudsman Law no. 17/2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59
as indicated earlier, the Office does not have the power to impose sanctions in cases 
of non-compliance, without reasonable explanation, with its recommendations. In 
addition, the Office uses the declarations of assets as a strategy for preventing and 
detecting corruption. But the verification of the submitted declarations, which can be 
a means of identifying corrupt officials, is not being carried out effectively. Not more 
than 20% of all the declarations are verified. 
  
3.1.2 Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra Leone 
In the fight against corruption, the Commission has the mandate to take all measures 
necessary for the prevention, eradication and suppression of corruption and related 
offences. The Commission has arranged its mandate into three approaches: 
prevention, education and prosecution. In order to fulfil these functions, the 
Commission, operating in three departments as mentioned earlier,97 uses different 
strategies and mechanisms. Like the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda, the 
preventive measures that the Commission utilises include educating the public about 
the dangers of corruption, examining the practices of public bodies, receiving and 
examining declarations of assets, and advising any person, authority, public or private 
                                                            
97 See Section 2.3.5 above. 
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institution on changes and practices needed to prevent corruption. Unlike the Office 
of Ombudsman of Rwanda, the Commission prevents corruption by monitoring the 
implementation of the contracts awarded by public bodies.  
 
3.1.2.1 Public Education and Outreach 
Section 7(2)(o) of the Anti-Corruption Act of 2008 mandates the Commission ‘to 
educate the public on the dangers of corruption and the benefits of its eradication; and 
to enlist and foster public support in combating corruption’. The Commission carries 
out this mandate by educating the public and institutions on the evils of corruption 
and the benefits of a corruption-free country. It also informs the public about its own 
attributes and encourages society to support the fight against corrupt activities. 
 
For effective implementation of public education, the Commission adopts the 
institutional and community-based approaches. In relation to the institutional 
approach, the Commission educates public officials on accountability, transparency 
and good practices for the reduction of corruption. It also educates students with the 
intention of fostering in them the values of integrity, accountability and transparency. 
As a result, there has been created twenty-seven integrity clubs in secondary schools. 
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With regard to the community-based approach, the Commission organises community 
education meetings to sensitise the public and civil society to its work and the evils of 
corruption, and to encourage public support in the fight against corruption.98 
Moreover, in educating the public, the Commission utilises the radio, television 
programmes (such as documentaries, music and drama), and newspapers.  
 
3.1.2.2 Systems and Processes Review 
The Commission is mandated also to examine the practices and procedures of public 
bodies.99 The Commission conducts a comprehensive systems and processes review 
in ministries, bodies and agencies in order to discover the structural loopholes for 
corruption and related offences, and then makes recommendations for the 
improvement of functions and the development of good practices.100 The 
recommendations have to be complied with by the institution concerned.   
 
Furthermore, as mentioned in its annual report of 2008, the Commission undertakes 
the rigorous monitoring of public funds, including donor funds, in order to ensure 
                                                            
98 The Annual Report of the Anti-Corruption Commission of Serra Leone (2008: 18-25). 
99 Section 7(f) of the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act of 2008. 
100 The Sierra Leonean ACC website, http://www.anticorruption.gov.sl/.   
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compliance with prescribed procedures and principles. This will promote 
accountability and transparency. It also monitors the implementation of contracts 
awarded to individuals or companies by public bodies to ensure that there are no 
irregularities involved, and suggests ways of instituting standards of integrity which 
would promote resistance to corruption.       
 
3.1.2.3. Advising on Corruption Prevention 
As far as prevention is concerned, the Commission conducts studies in order to 
discover the causes and consequences of corruption. Further, it reviews laws, policies 
and codes of conduct in order to identify any loopholes for corruption or to assess 
whether they are conducive to corruption. Thus, the Commission advises the 
Government on such legislative reform that it considers necessary to eliminate 
corruption. It also advises the state on the ratification of the international 
anti-corruption instruments. The Commission provides useful advice to any person 
and private institutions, and instructs public bodies on changes in practices and 
procedures needed to eliminate corruption. The head of a public body which fails to 
comply with the instructions given commits an offence and he or she is liable.101 The 
                                                            
101 Section 7 of the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act of 2008; the ACC website 
http://www.anticorruption.gov.sl.   
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advices and reviews of laws and codes of conduct promote the elimination of corrupt 
practices and encourage honest behaviour.  
 
3.1.2.4 Assets Declarations 
With the enactment of the Anti-Corruption Act of 2008, the Commission adopted a 
further strategy of preventing corruption by making it compulsory for all public 
officials to declare their assets to the Commission every year by no later than 31 
March. The person who becomes a public official has to declare his or her assets 
within three months of taking office. The person who ceases to be a public official has 
to declare his or her assets on the first anniversary of the date on which he or she left 
office. The declaration must include all earnings and debts of the declarant himself or 
herself, and of his or her spouse and children.102  
 
As in Rwanda, the assets declared are kept confidential except when the particular 
declaration is required for the purposes of court proceedings. However, after 
                                                            
102 Section 119 of the Sierra Leonean Anti-corruption Act of 2008. 
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examining the declaration received and being satisfied by the information provided in 
it, the Commission publicises a certificate in the Gazette.103   
 
In contrast to the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda, where the declarations of 
assets are reserved for a number of public officials enumerated in the anti-corruption 
law, the Anti-Corruption Act of Sierra Leone requires all public officials to declare 
their assets. The approach adopted by Sierra Leone may be better, but the feasibility 
of examining the declarations of all public officials is questionable.  
 
3.1.3 Anti-Corruption Bureau of Malawi 
The functions of the Bureau include, among others, taking all necessary measures for 
the prevention of corrupt practices in the public and private sectors. To fulfil this 
function, the Bureau, like the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda and the 
Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra Leone, employs different strategies, such as 
the public education, examining the practices and procedures of public and private 
institutions and advising them on ways of preventing corruption. However, the 
                                                            
103 Section 119 of the Sierra Leonean Anti-corruption Act of 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65
Bureau does not use declarations of assets as a tool for preventing and detecting 
corrupt practices of public officials, such as embezzlement and illicit enrichment.    
 
3.1.3.1 Public Education 
The Bureau is mandated to spread information on the dangers of corrupt practices for 
society, and to enlist and encourage public support against corrupt practices.104 To 
this end, the Bureau has established and maintains extensive programmes, and a 
number of educational activities targeting all sectors of society have been executed in 
order to raise public awareness of the evils of corruption and to encourage the public 
to report, resist and reject corruption. These activities include billboards in strategic 
places in urban areas, public campaign meetings, radio and television programmes, 
workshops targeting NGOs, Community-Based Organisations and other groups, and 
the creation of anti-corruption clubs in secondary schools and universities.105  
 
                                                            
104 Section 10 of the Corrupt Practices Act of Malawi of 2004. 
105 Mustafa (2005: 96). See also Nampota (2008: 2-3). 
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3.1.3.2 Examining the Practices and Procedures of Institutions 
In its effort to prevent of corruption in public and private institutions, the Bureau 
examines their practices and procedures in order to discover those that are conducive 
to corruption and then revises them. Moreover, the Bureau reviews methods, systems 
and draft legislation or proposals for new legislation that might have corruption as an 
area of concern. It also analyses the procedures that institutions follow in delivering 
services in order to identify any loopholes for corruption, and implements 
anti-corruption strategies.106 These preventive measures are undertaken with a view 
to reducing the opportunities for and the occurrence of corrupt practices in both 
private and public sectors. 
 
Like the two other anti-corruption agencies discussed above, after examining or 
reviewing the systems and procedures, the Bureau provides recommendations to 
change or replace them and conducts follow-up assessments to monitor their 
implementation. As with the Sierra Leonean Commission, non-compliance with the 
directions and orders of the Bureau is an offence and is punishable.107  
 
                                                            
106 Nampota (2008: 3). 
107 Section 49 of the Corrupt Practices Act of Malawi of 2004. 
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3.1.3.3 Advising on Corruption Prevention 
Under section 10 of the Corrupt Practices Act of 2004, the Bureau, like the Office of 
the Ombudsman of Rwanda and the Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra Leone, is 
mandated to advise public and private bodies on ways and means of preventing 
corruption and on procedural changes that the Bureau considers necessary to reduce 
corruption. In this regard, the Bureau has implemented a programme ‘to assist 
institutions develop and implement a Corruption Prevention Policy framework as a 
way of mainstreaming anti-corruption initiatives into their functioning’.108   
 
It is fair to say that the Anti-Corruption Bureau has developed strategies of preventing 
corruption by educating the public about corruption, and about ways to resist and 
report it. It also prevents corruption by examining the procedures of public and private 
bodies. However, the shortage of human and financial resources limits the 
effectiveness of its preventive measures and public education, which require frequent 
travelling outside its offices. For instance, the vehicles that are available to the Bureau 
are inadequate for its operations in different areas of the country, and as a result, most 
                                                            
108 Nampota (2008: 4). 
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often Bureau professionals travel by bus, the most common means of public 
transport.109  
 
3.1.4 General Remarks 
The three anti-corruption agencies being discussed use similar strategies in fighting 
corruption, most frequently reviewing the practices and procedures of institutions and 
giving recommendations accordingly, educating the public, advising on corruption 
prevention, and declaring assets. To ensure the credibility of the recommendations 
provided by the anti-corruption agency, non-compliance is considered as an offence 
and is punishable. However, this enforcement power is not available to the Office of 
the Ombudsman of Rwanda, which may result in the futility of its recommendations. 
Unlike the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda and the Sierra Leonean 
Anti-Corruption Commission, declarations of assets, which is an efficient weapon to 
prevent and detect corruption of public officials, is not being used by the Malawian 
Anti-Corruption Bureau in preventing corruption.    
 
                                                            
109 Mustafa (2005: 96). 
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After analysing their corruption prevention strategies and mechanisms, it is clear that 
the anti-corruption agencies are government advisory organs and play a great role in 
the establishment of laws preventing corruption. They are also the agencies which 
help public and private institutions to accomplish effectively their functions by 
providing them with advice through recommendations. Moreover, they train the 
public in all sectors about corruption.  
 
It seems that anti-corruption agencies commonly perform the following functions: 
receiving and examining complaints, educating the public about corruption, 
examining the functioning of public institutions and providing suitable 
recommendations for improvement, and receiving and examining declarations of 
assets. These responsibilities are very strong and their accomplishment necessitates 
special skills and sufficient resources. However, as already intimated, the 
anti-corruption agencies under discussion do not have the skilled staff they require 
and sometimes their material resources are inadequate also.      
 
Despite the numerous mechanisms used by the anti-corruption agencies in preventing 
corruption, it is still possible for corrupt practices to be committed in one way or 
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another. Therefore, in addition to preventive strategies, the anti-corruption agencies 
provide for ex post facto mechanisms to combat corruption.  
 
Corruption cannot be overcome if preventive measures are not accompanied by 
effective deterrent mechanisms. To this end, not only corruption and related offences 
have to be criminalised, but also the anti-corruption agencies must be given sufficient 
powers to detect, investigate and prosecute corruption. The next section concentrates 
on the powers vested in the aforementioned anti-corruption agencies and on the 
investigative techniques required for making the fight against corruption effective. 
   
3.2 Investigative Powers 
The fight against corruption cannot be effective if the anti-corruption agencies are not 
entrusted with strong investigative powers, operational means and instruments for 
gathering evidence.110 The Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda, the 
Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra Leone and the Anti-Corruption Bureau of 
Malawi are equipped with the authority to investigate corruption and related offences. 
Under this section, the methods of obtaining information on corruption cases, as well 
                                                            
110 Eser and Kubiciel (2005: 61). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71
as the methods of obtaining evidence currently used by anti-corruption agencies are 
analysed. 
 
3.2.1 Methods of Obtaining Information  
Due to the difficulty of detecting corruption, information plays an important role. The 
anti-corruption agencies may find information on corrupt practices when examining 
the practices, procedures and systems of institutions. They often receive information 
from whistleblowers on allegedly corrupt practices through reporting in person, by 
e-mail, by anonymous letters or by telephone.111 Through popular education, the 
public is informed about the agency and the place at which reports may be lodged. 
 
After receiving information on corruption, the agency analyses it. If there is adequate 
justification for an investigation, the appointment of an investigator or investigators 
has to be made. Depending on the seriousness of the case, the agency may decide to 
appoint one or more investigators with knowledge in different fields.  
 
                                                            
111 The anti-corruption agencies under discussion have developed the system of receiving information on      
    corruption. They all have websites, e-mail addresses and free hotlines. 
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During investigations, any anti-corruption agency may face a problem of obtaining 
information and evidence. In many cases corruption does not have a clear victim who 
can complain or no overt occurrence to be reported by a third person. That is the 
reason why corruption is considered wrongly as a ‘victimless’ crime. However, as 
noted by James, ‘the crime is not victimless in the sense that society as a whole is a 
victim, and on occasion there may be an individual victim who is perhaps deprived of 
a benefit which he or she would have received had not the other person obtained the 
benefit as the result of a bribe’.112 Nevertheless, even if corrupt practices are not in 
fact victimless, usually the victims are not aware that corruption has been committed 
and has affected them negatively. In most cases, the only persons with express 
knowledge of the corruption are the people who involved in its commission, such as 
the offeror and receiver of the bribe or the person who embezzled the funds.113 The 
secretive nature of corruption makes it difficult to obtain relevant information. Those 
involved in corruption will not easily report it because they generally profit in some 
way.    
 
                                                            
112 James (2010: 4).  
113 James (2010: 4). 
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It is for this reason that often corruption only comes to light when there is a 
misunderstanding between the individuals involved and one of them decides to 
expose it. Sometimes it may be reported by a person who is working in the place 
where corruption took or is to take place. However, those who are aware of the 
commission of corruption may not report it because they fear retaliation by the 
suspect. To ensure the reporting of corruption, protective measures for whistleblowers 
and informants, as well as a legal provision making reporting obligatory or providing 
incentives, must be guaranteed. The anti-corruption laws in the countries under 
discussion do contain provisions in this regard.   
 
The extent to which reporting corruption is made an obligation differs from one 
country to another. In Sierra Leonean law, every public official who suspects that 
corruption has been or is about to be committed within the public institution has a 
duty to make a written report to the Anti-Corruption Commission; but in Malawian 
law, only the public official to whom any advantage is corruptly given, promised or 
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offered has an obligation to make a full report of the circumstances of the case to the 
appropriate organ.114 The Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law is silent on the issue.  
 
In addition to or in place of the obligation to report corruption, some anti-corruption 
laws provide for rewards for informants. The Sierra Leonean law states that any 
person who gives information on corrupt practices that results in a conviction shall be 
paid ten percent of the proceeds of the property forfeited.115 Similarly, the Rwandan 
Anti-Corruption Law, which contains no reporting obligation, provides for a bonus 
for the person who contributed to the denunciation of corruption without taking part 
in its commission. Further, the Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law provides for mitigatory 
measures for a person who makes a confession before the transmission of his or her 
file to the court.116 The monetary or other rewards and the mitigatory measures 
provided for those who give information or make confessions are attractive 
mechanisms of getting information and evidence of corruption, in the absence of 
which the level of reporting corruption could be extremely low.       
 
                                                            
114 Section 77 of the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act of 2008; section 36 of the Corrupt Practices 
Act of Malawi of 2004. 
115 Section 81(3) of the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act of 2008. 
116 Article 37-39 of the Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law no. 23/2003. 
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The fear of retaliation is a serious obstacle to the effective detection of corruption. To 
overcome this obstacle, whistleblower and witness protection mechanisms have to be 
put in place. The Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act contains provisions aimed at 
the protection of whistleblowers and witnesses. That Act provides for the 
confidentiality of information and of the identity of whistleblowers and witnesses. 
Those who provide information are not to be the subject of civil or criminal 
proceedings as a result of disclosures made. Likewise, the Malawian Corrupt 
Practices Act ensures the secrecy of the identity of witnesses and whistleblowers.117 
In Malawi and Sierra Leone, protection is also ensured by criminalising the 
victimisation by any person of whistleblowers or witnesses for disclosures made. In 
relation to Rwanda, the Anti-Corruption Law does not specify any protective 
measures, but in Article 36 it requires the organ in charge of handling corruption 
cases to ensure the protection of whistleblowers and witnesses.      
 
To avoid the abuse of information by informants themselves, false allegations made in 
bad faith and failure, without relevant reason, to provide information during the 
investigations period are punishable by both Malawian and Sierra Leonean 
                                                            
117 Section 82 of the Sierra Leone Anti-Corruption Act of 2008; section 51A of the Corrupt Practices Act 
of Malawi of 2004.  
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anti-corruption laws.118 The Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law does not address the 
issue. 
 
3.2.2 Methods of Obtaining Evidence 
The normal investigative powers include powers to issue a summons or other order 
requiring an individual to appear before the agency, to require any person to answer 
questions during an investigation, to hold public hearings in a formal way, to require 
the production of relevant documents, and to conduct searches and seizures.119     
 
The staff in the operational units of the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda recently 
have been given the power to investigate all activities relating to the functions of the 
Office of the Ombudsman. These powers are to be exercised independently and in 
accordance with the law.120 In this regard, the Office has the power to request from 
public or private institutions and non-governmental organisations any documents, 
testimonies and explanations necessary for its investigations. Also, it may require any 
                                                            
118 Section 14 of the Malawian Corrupt Practice Act of 2004; Section 86 of the Sierra Leonean 
Anti-Corruption Act of 2008.  
119 Nicholls et al (2006: 480). 
120 Articles 1-3 of the Ministerial Order no. 67 of 05/05/2009 granting judicial powers to the staff of the 
Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda. 
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person to give necessary information.121 Taking a critical view, it might be said that 
the powers given to the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to investigations are 
very vague. The law does not stipulate clearly whether the Office has, for example, 
the powers to search and seize, or to arrest with or without warrant.  
 
Differing from the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda, the Anti-Corruption 
Commission of Sierra Leone and Anti-Corruption Bureau of Malawi have been given 
clear and precise investigative powers. The Anti-Corruption Bureau is empowered to 
investigate all offences under the Corrupt Practices Act and those under any other 
laws discovered in the course of investigating corrupt practices. During the 
investigation, the Bureau has authority to require any person to provide information or 
to order the production of documents. It further has the power, but with a warrant 
issued by the court, to inspect all books, record, returns, reports and bank accounts, 
and to search the premises of the suspect.122 Under section 23, the Bureau is 
authorised also, with a warrant, to seize and freeze any document, money, account, 
asset, property or other interest for the purposes of investigation. If there are serious 
reasons to believe that corruption has been or is to be committed, the Bureau may 
                                                            
121 Article 19 of the Ombudsman Law no. 25/2003. 
122 Sections 10-12 of the Corrupt Practices Act of Malawi of 2004. 
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arrest the suspected person with a warrant.123      
 
Like the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra Leone 
has powers to require any person to provide information or produce documents for the 
purposes of investigation. The person may also be required to produce the declaration 
of his or her property. If the person under investigation is about to leave the country, 
the Commission has the authority to require him or her to surrender all travel 
documents. Moreover, the Commission is entrusted with the power of search and 
seizure. In contrast to the Bureau, the Commission has the power to access bank 
accounts and to arrest the suspect without warrant. It has, as well, the power to 
finger-print and photograph the arrested person. 124  
 
The anti-corruption agencies are equipped with investigative powers and they can 
require information from or the production of any document by any person. They 
have also the authority to search and seize, and to arrest the suspect with or without 
warrant. In the situation where a corrupt person is caught red-handed, the arrest 
without warrant is considered to be the best means of protecting the evidence. 
                                                            
123 Section 15 of the Corrupt Practices Act of Malawi of 2004. 
124 For more details of the investigative powers of Anti-Corruption Commission see part 5 of 
Anti-Corruption Act of 2008.  
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Moreover, search and seizure without court authorisation have proved to be 
particularly helpful in obtaining relevant evidence without delay.125  
 
Overall, in investigating corruption, reporting is the major means which helps the 
investigators to discover corruption. The annual declarations of assets by public 
officials and the regular examination of practices and procedures of institutions are 
also techniques being used by the anti-corruption agencies in question to detect 
corruption. They provide them with the power to identify the existence of corrupt 
practices and serve as the basis of investigations. 
 
3.3 Special Investigative Techniques 
As mentioned above the secretive nature of corrupt practices, particularly those 
involving public officials, makes it difficult to use reactive measures. Usually, the 
offer or solicitation of corruption exists between two satisfied parties with no 
independent witnesses. Thus, if there is no desire by one of them to disclose, it will 
not be easy to detect corruption and to find the necessary evidence. Indeed, a 
                                                            
125 UNODC (2004: 389). 
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proactive approach, using special investigative techniques will be the best way to 
achieve a successful investigation. 
 
3.3.1 Interception of Communications and Surveillance 
The interception and the recording of telephone conversations, or telefax messages, 
e-mails or postal items of a suspect are useful means to detect corruption and can 
serve as evidence in criminal proceedings. However, in the legal systems of different 
countries there is a restriction on the monitoring of electronic communications.126 
With regard to the anti-corruption investigative function, such restriction should not 
be considered if interception or monitoring is done with legitimate authority. 
 
Surveillance is another proactive technique of investigation that can be undertaken 
through monitoring or observing the suspect’s movements or recording or listening to 
his or her communications. It can be conducted also with the assistance of 
surveillance cameras. The surveillance undertaken for the purposes of investigations 
in corruption cases may result in obtaining private information about an individual. It 
can be carried out with the assistance of an individual or a surveillance device in order 
                                                            
126 UNOCD (2004: 374-375). 
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to have evidence of a certain act that is taking place during a specific period of time in 
residential premises or elsewhere.127  
 
The surveillance equipment can be installed in order to monitor the activities of an 
individual or a specific group of individuals on the basis of information received. To 
be lawful, the surveillance for the purposes of investigations has to be authorised and 
be completed within a reasonable period of time. 
 
3.3.2 Covert Methodologies  
Because corruption is difficult to detect, the use of covert methodologies can be 
helpful to catch the suspect red-handed. This method usually is based on information 
received or found. ‘The proactive operation might involve information from a source, 
intelligence and/or evidence from the deployment of an undercover agent or 
participating source and surveillance product.’128       
 
                                                            
127 Nicholls et al (2006: 141-143). 
128 Nicholls et al (2006: 133). 
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For a successful result, an undercover agent has to be given the means and powers 
allowing him or her to establish a sufficient relationship with the suspect that he or 
she can use to obtain or to have access to the relevant information. The use of covert 
investigative techniques in corruption cases should be regulated and authorised by the 
domestic law of a country, based on the principle of necessity and proportionality in 
order to avoid its abuse. 
 
3.3.3 Entrapment and Integrity Testing 
In order to detect and gather evidence in relation to corruption and misconduct of 
public officials in a particular institution, a proactive anti-corruption method can be 
used by deploying an undercover agent to be solicited for corruption by a suspected 
corrupt official. In such an operation, the investigator has to ensure that he remains an 
investigator, not a creator of corruption.129 Integrity testing includes ‘the use of 
decoys and tactics which represent the most powerful means for both detecting and 
deterring corruption and related offences by the public officials who are targeted on 
the basis of evidence of a specific suspicion of corruption’.130  
 
                                                            
129 Nicholls et al (2006: 148). 
130 UNODC (2004: 396). 
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The undercover agent must act in order to offer suspicious officials the opportunity to 
engage in corruption, but nothing more. This operation will provide quick and 
credible evidence about the resistance of corruption by the official. The feedback 
must be supported by, for instance, audiotapes, photographs or videotapes. To avoid 
adverse results, it is important to set up the rules and regulations to be followed during 
the operation. It is also necessary to provide protective measures for the undercover 
agent, as well as for informants.     
 
In order to combat corruption effectively, UNCAC requires states parties to use 
special investigative techniques such as electronic surveillance and the like.131 The 
use of special investigative techniques is essential for a successful investigation. In 
this regard, only the Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra Leone uses special 
proactive mechanisms in terms of which its Intelligence Unit collects high quality 
intelligence on a corrupt person.132 However, the techniques it uses are not made 
known. 
 
                                                            
131 Article 50 of UNCAC. 
132 The Annual Report of the Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra Leone (2008: 26). 
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The requirements of all these proactive investigative techniques are professional 
training, adequate operational support and a comprehensive management system to 
ensure that they are effective, legal and in compliance with the rules of evidence.133 
Each of the anti-corruption techniques listed above has to be authorised and regulated 
by domestic law and be undertaken on the basis of the information received about 
corrupt practices in a given institution or of a particular individual. Those techniques 
not only help with the establishment of evidence of corrupt practices but also prevent 
corruption by creating the possibility or risk that the public officials may be 
discovered. Thus, they are of crucial importance for an effective anti-corruption 
programme.  
 
3.4 Prosecutorial Powers 
In some countries, the anti-corruption agencies are mandated not only to prevent and 
investigate corruption and related offences but also to prosecute them. In this 
connection, the Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra Leone possesses prosecutorial 
powers. Likewise, the Anti-Corruption Bureau of Malawi is empowered to prosecute 
                                                            
133 Tony (2009:143). 
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any corrupt practice.134 In contrast, the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda is not 
empowered to prosecute corruption. After investigations, evidence is forwarded to the 
Office of Prosecutor-General, which office prosecutes all crimes, including 
corruption. 
 
On the basis of the investigation results, the Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra 
Leone may institute prosecution if it considers it necessary, without any further 
requirement. However, the Anti-Corruption Bureau of Malawi may not initiate 
proceedings without the written consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). 
This is emphasised by section 10 of the Corrupt Practices Act which states that the 
‘Bureau shall, subject to directions of the DPP, prosecute all offences under the Act’. 
In the case of withholding of consent, the DPP is required to give written reasons and 
inform the Legal Affairs Committee of Parliament within 30 days.135 Even if the DPP 
is required to provide reasons in the case of refusal, the requirement of seeking 
consent before instituting the prosecution not only undermines the independence of 
the Bureau but also may lead to bias and delays in the prosecution of corrupt persons 
                                                            
134 Section 7(1) of the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act of 2008; section 10 of the Corrupt Practices 
Act of Malawi of 2004. 
135 Section 42 of the Corrupt Practices Act of Malawi of 2004. 
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(for instance, the high-ranking officials). This requirement has been judged also to be 
‘painful to an anti-corruption institution to see people against whom it has strong 
evidence of having committed corrupt practices being allowed to go scot-free by the 
consenting authorities for undisclosed reasons’.136    
 
Normally, the prosecutorial services deal with all crimes, which may result in their 
being snowed under with work. To speed up the criminal proceedings in corruption 
cases, it is very important to accord independent prosecutorial powers to the 
anti-corruption agencies. 
 
In prosecuting corruption, the prosecutors generally face the problem of the burden of 
proof. Normally in criminal matters, the burden of proof is on the prosecutor. When it 
comes to illicit enrichment, which is defined in article 20 of UNCAC as ‘a significant 
increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in 
relation to his or her lawful income’, the burden of proof is reversed and imposed on 
the suspect. If a person fails to prove the licit origin of his or her wealth, he or she is 
liable for illicit enrichment. In order to avoid the problem which may be raised by this 
                                                            
136 Nsereko and Kebonang (2005: 103). 
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principle, the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act stipulates that the burden of proof 
in corruption cases lies on the accused.137 The Rwandan and Malawian 
anti-corruption laws provide for illicit enrichment as a corrupt act, but they do not 
address the issue of the burden of proof. 
 
The reversal of the burden of proof has been criticised as unconstitutional, in the 
sense that it undermines the fundamental principle of the presumption of innocence, 
and violates the right to silence of the accused person.138 The criminalisation of illicit 
enrichment deters officials from embezzling public funds or engaging in corrupt acts. 
It is submitted that the reversal of the burden of proof in relation to illicit enrichment 
is to be considered as an exception to the principle and, thus, it ought not to be 
considered as a violation of the right to a fair trial. In order to avoid possible 
challenges to the criminalisation of illicit enrichment, the legislative organ should 
adopt a specific act providing for an exception to the conventional burden of proof in 
cases of illicit enrichment.   
                                                            
137 Section 94 of the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Act of 2008. 
138 For instance, section 42(2)(f) of the Malawian Constitution recognizes the right to a fair trial 
including the right to silence, whereas section 32 of the Corrupt Practices Act provides for the 
offence of ‘the possession unexplained property’, whereby the suspect is obliged to prove the origin 
of the property. This provision has been criticised as unconstitutional by some courts but for others it 
has been interpreted to be an exception to the principle. See Kamanga (2008: 157).      
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Taking a comparative view, it might be said that the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption 
Commission is more empowered than the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda, 
which does not have prosecutorial powers, and the Anti-Corruption Bureau of Malawi 
which neither can arrest without warrant nor prosecute without the consent of the 
DPP. Due to the lack of sufficient powers, the anti-corruption agencies face crucial 
constraints, for example, delays and ineffective criminal proceedings in corruption 
cases transmitted to judicial authorities, usually the Prosecutor-General.139     
 
Corruption is a crime which may cross borders and occur in different territories. Its 
proceeds often are transferred from one country to another. For instance, the bribe can 
be committed in Rwanda but its proceeds are deposited into a Sierra Leonean bank. In 
this regard, most of the conventions discussed above contain provisions on mutual 
legal assistance and international co-operation to facilitate the fight against 
corruption. UNCAC includes a variety of provisions detailing co-operation between 
national institutions themselves; and between national public institutions and the 
private sector, international co-operation, mutual legal assistance, co-operation 
                                                            
139 The constraints that the Office of the Ombudsman faces in the fulfilment of its mission include delays 
or ineffective follow-up of the cases it forwards to the other judicial authorities for criminal 
proceeding. See Annual report of the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda (2008: 72).  
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between law enforcement agencies and extradition.140 The AU Convention, the 
SADC Protocol and the ECOWAS Protocol contain detailed provisions on mutual 
legal assistance and international co-operation among state members.141 Under those 
provisions, the states parties are required to provide one another with mutual legal 
assistance and international co-operation in order to obtain evidence and to facilitate 
investigations and prosecutions of corruption cases.  
 
Mutual legal assistance and international co-operation are very important to facilitate 
investigations, the obtaining of evidence, and the confiscation and return of assets of 
corruption. The Anti-Corruption Act of Sierra Leone in its part 7, unlike the 
anti-corruption laws of Rwanda and Malawi, provides for mutual legal assistance and 
international co-operation in the fight against corruption. 
  
 
 
                                                            
140 Articles 38, 38, 43, 44, 46 and 48 of UNCAC. 
141 Articles 18-19 of the AU Convention, articles 9-10 of the SADC Protocol and article 15 of the 
ECOWAS Protocol.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
This chapter presents a brief summary of what has been discovered and discussed in 
the previous chapters. It concludes with recommendations pertaining to the 
requirements of a successful anti-corruption agency.    
 
4.1 Conclusion 
From the above analysis, it appears that corruption is a widespread problem which 
affects all societies, whether developed or not. It has a corrosive impact on the 
sustainable economic development of a country and is detrimental to good 
governance and the well-being of the citizen. This research has ascertained that the 
governments of Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Malawi are committed to the fight against 
corruption. Their efforts in the war on corruption have been demonstrated by the 
ratification of international and regional anti-corruption laws, the criminalisation of 
corruption and related offences by national laws, and the establishment of 
anti-corruption institutions capable of enforcing anti-corruption laws.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91
An effective anti-corruption regime requires a comprehensive anti-corruption legal 
framework which not only punishes all forms of corruption but also capacitates 
anti-corruption institutions. In the countries covered by this work, the anti-corruption 
laws contain detailed provisions on corrupt practices, their punishment, protection of 
whistle-blowers and informants, false information, asset recovery and co-operation. 
However, the Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law is very limited and does not provide for 
certain forms of corruption such as embezzlement, conflict of interest of all public 
officials, protection for whistleblowers, and asset recovery.    
 
With respect to the anti-corruption agencies in the designated countries, the efforts 
focused on the establishment of independent and specialised anti-corruption agencies 
with the sole task of preventing and combating corruption. However, the Office of the 
Ombudsman of Rwanda has an additional mandate of preventing and combating 
injustice. 
 
Preventing corruption before its occurrence could be an effective approach in the fight 
against corruption if it is organised and implemented successfully. This research paper 
has analysed and discussed fully the mechanisms used by anti-corruption agencies in 
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preventing corruption. It was found that public education, examining regularly the 
practices and procedures of institutions, and the declarations of assets are the most 
helpful preventive instruments. Declarations of assets are not only a preventive 
mechanism but also a detection tool. 
 
The anti-corruption agencies contribute to the improvement of the functioning of 
institutions through recommendations. However, due to the lack of enforcement 
powers, the recommendations of the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda risk being 
trivialised.      
 
This paper also discussed the powers and techniques used by the anti-corruption 
agencies in investigating and detecting corruption. A strong anti-corruption agency is 
a crucial requirement and part of a country’s strategy for a successful anti-corruption 
programme. The anti-corruption agencies covered by this study are empowered 
differently. Unlike the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda which has only 
investigative powers, the Sierra Leonean Anti-Corruption Commission and the 
Malawian Anti-Corruption Bureau have investigative and prosecutorial powers. 
While the Anti-Corruption Commission can arrest without warrant and initiate 
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prosecution without the consent of the public prosecutor, the Malawian 
Anti-Corruption Bureau needs a warrant to arrest and the consent of the DPP in order 
to initiate prosecutions (which may result in delays). From this perspective, it is fair to 
submit that for an anti-corruption agency to be effective it must be given not only the 
power to investigate but also the power to initiate independently the prosecution of 
corruption cases.    
 
It was indicated that the clandestine and complex nature of corruption and the absence 
of direct witnesses and victims render it difficult to investigate and detect. Therefore, 
it is important for any anti-corruption agency to be allowed the use of special 
investigative techniques, such as the deployment of undercover agents, surveillance, 
interception of communication and entrapment to detect and obtain viable evidence. 
However, it was noted that the anti-corruption agencies under discussion use normal 
investigative techniques, and their investigations usually depend on information from 
and allegations by individuals through reporting.        
 
It might be said that the failure or the success of an anti-corruption agency depends on 
a variety of factors, such as powers and means to detect, investigate and prosecute 
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corruption and related offences. The lack of sufficient and trained staff, as well as the 
lack of adequate material resources, also affects the effectiveness of an anti-corruption 
agency. Further, collaboration and cooperation with other states, the public, media 
and civil society play an important role.142  
 
To sum up, it is submitted that the establishment of an anti-corruption agency is a 
requirement in the fight against corruption. Its effectiveness may be ensured by the 
powers and means at its disposal. The anti-corruption agencies covered by this 
research paper are not sufficiently empowered or resourced, which may result in their 
ineffectiveness. For a better functioning of the anti-corruption agencies, the next 
section provides a set of recommendations in respect of the powers and strategies 
needed for a successful anti-corruption programme.     
 
                                                            
142 OECD (2007: 23-24). This document discusses the 7 reasons, called by Doig (2004) the ‘Seven 
Deadly Sins’, that may cause the failure of an anti-corruption agency. They are ‘political, economic, 
legal, performance, organisational, governance and public confidence factors.’  
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4.2 Recommendations 
This section comprises general recommendations which are common to all three 
anti-corruption agencies, and specific recommendations applicable to each individual 
agency. 
 
4.2.1 General Recommendations 
The independence and the autonomy appropriate to the functions of an anti-corruption 
agency are crucial requirements for its effectiveness. Basically, the stability and the 
independence of an anti-corruption agency should be ensured by providing for its 
establishment in the Constitution, and the appointment of its members should be 
governed by clear rules and involve different authorities.   
 
In relation to the criminalisation of corruption and all its forms, in general the 
anti-corruption agencies should continue the adaptation of the anti-corruption 
legislative framework, in order to avoid gaps which may result from legal 
development lagging behind social, economic and political changes. 
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In the fight against corruption, an anti-corruption body cannot fulfil its functions 
without support from the public, the media and civil society groups. To gain this 
support, the anti-corruption agency should focus and continue its education 
programmes through which it informs and encourages those groups to collaborate in 
the fight against corrupt practices. In this regard, measures should be taken to ensure 
the involvement of the media in a permanent relationship with those groups 
combating corruption. Moreover, public education measures on corruption should be 
improved and the integration of modules on corruption issues into school and 
university curricula should be required. In order to raise public awareness about the 
dangers of corruption and the benefits of a corruption-free society, regular radio and 
television programmes should be organised and maintained.  
 
Given the general difficulty of obtaining evidence in corruption matters, it is usual for 
an anti-corruption agency to be given effective means of collecting evidence, strong 
powers, and allowed the use of special investigative techniques. Therefore, the 
existing legislation in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Malawi should be modified and 
complemented so as to give more powers to the anti-corruption agencies and permit 
the use of the special techniques that they lack at present. 
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As noted earlier, examination of the practices and systems of institutions and public 
education are the instruments which are used often in the fight against corruption in 
most countries. Deterrence (through investigations and prosecutions) is another issue 
which is considered to be the very important. In most cases, corruption involves 
senior authorities who have been educated and know the dangers of corruption. Due 
to the low chance of being discovered, they continue to commit corruption despite the 
knowledge of its bad effects, because they intend to gain more profits.143 The best 
way to deter them from being corrupt is to raise high the risk of being caught by using 
sufficiently proactive mechanisms.    
 
The powers vested in an anti-corruption agency play a crucial role in its performance. 
A successful anti-corruption agency should be given strong powers such as 
investigative powers including search, seizure and arrest without warrant, and 
independent prosecutorial powers. It is also important for an anti-corruption agency to 
be allowed the use of special investigative techniques like surveillance, entrapment or 
integrity testing, and interception of communication in order to detect corruption. 
                                                            
143 Tony (2009: 140). 
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The regulation of the use of a proactive approach in investigating corruption must 
ensure that investigative techniques, such as interception of communications and 
other forms of surveillance and undercover operations, are consistent with 
international human rights and in compliance with national laws. 
 
Corruption can be revealed by an individual who is aware of its commission. That 
individual may be a person working within the corrupt institution or a person who is 
part of a corruption network. When an allegation is made, the anti-corruption agency 
ascertains whether there is sufficient reason for an investigation. The allegation 
should be analysed in order to determine its credibility. The evidence provided should 
be assessed carefully to determine whether it has been fabricated through frustration, 
resentment or in pursuit of a reward or any other personal profit. 
 
The whistleblower has been an important source of information on corrupt practices. 
Sometimes the disclosure of corrupt practices may result in mistreatment, dismissal 
from office or other discriminatory actions. Hence, laws should be established or 
provisions inserted into existing laws to protect whistleblowers and informants. They 
should be protected from retaliation by the suspect and there should be incentive 
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mechanisms to increase the level of corruption reporting. In addition, the protective 
measures should be improved and should include protecting a reporting public servant 
from being sacked or mistreated.   
 
Obligations to report corruption are considered to be the common tool to collect 
information about alleged crimes.144 Therefore, the anti-corruption laws should make 
it mandatory not only for a public official but also for any person, regardless of 
occupation or professional status, to report to the anti-corruption agency or any other 
appropriate authority any corrupt practice committed or about to be committed by a 
public servant or by any other person. Failure to do so has to be considered a criminal 
offence. This will help anti-corruption agencies to be informed adequately about the 
occurrence of corruption and thereafter corruption will be reduced. 
 
It is necessary to note that an anti-corruption agency itself needs to be transparent and 
accountable. Therefore, the existence of an oversight committee is essential to ensure 
the transparency and effectiveness of an anti-corruption agency. In Sierra Leone, the 
Advisory Committee controls and assesses the activities of the Anti-Corruption 
                                                            
144 ADB/OECD (2006: 49). 
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Commission and advises on the improvement of its functions. This prevents it from 
being corrupt itself and contributes to its independence and success. In Rwanda and 
Malawi such a body should be established to monitor the functions of the Office of 
the Ombudsman of Rwanda and the Malawian Anti-Corruption Bureau. 
 
The success or the failure of an anti-corruption agency may depend on the quantity 
and the quality of resources at its disposal. Thus, the fulfilment of the specific mission 
of an anti-corruption agency depends on sufficient material resources and well-trained 
staff, including specialised skilled staff. Therefore, an anti-corruption agency should 
be given the necessary material resources (for example, cars), enough staff and 
regular professional training, especially in legal, financial, accounting, economic, 
investigative and prosecutorial skills.      
 
Internationally, the states should establish and update the treaties on mutual legal 
assistance and co-operation in order to facilitate the exchange of information on 
corruption, including investigations (obtaining of evidence), criminal proceedings and 
the return of the proceeds of corruption cases. 
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4.2.2 Recommendations Specific to the Office of Ombudsman of Rwanda 
The Rwandan Anti-Corruption Law should be reviewed and amended to include all 
forms of corruption as provided for by UNCAC. To this end, the Sierra Leonean 
Anti-Corruption Act may serve as a model. In addition, the law providing for the 
investigative powers of the Office of Ombudsman should be revised to specify clearly 
the powers invested in the Office.  
 
The Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda should be given prosecutorial powers, and 
the power to take binding decisions. The discretionary power to enforce its 
recommendations will allow the Office to impose criminal sanctions on any person 
who fails to implement them.    
 
To facilitate the reporting of corruption, the Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda 
should establish branch offices in all areas of the country. These offices must be given 
the power to conduct investigations and criminal proceedings and thereafter 
periodically report to the Office of the Ombudsman.  
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The Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda should improve the system of checking the 
assets declared by ensuring the regular verification of all declarations made. This will 
be possible by increasing the number of staff in the unit in charge of receiving and 
verifying the declarations. 
         
4.2.3 Recommendations Specific to the Anti-Corruption Bureau of Malawi 
Corruption preventive measures in the public administration should be extended and 
go beyond keeping an eye on public officials at work. In order to prevent corruption, 
political leaders in all branches of government ought to have transparency in their 
own financial dealings through assets declarations for themselves and their spouses 
and children. Therefore, the Corrupt Practices Act of Malawi should contain 
provisions requiring senior officials, or those occupying sensitive posts, to declare 
their wealth regularly.  
 
In order to ensure the independence and the effectiveness of the anti-corruption 
agency, and avoid delays and opportunities for bias, the prosecution of corruption 
cases should be initiated and conducted by the Bureau, without the need for the 
consent of the Public Prosecutor. 
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4.2.4 Recommendation Specific to the Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra 
Leone 
The Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra Leone should carefully assess the 
feasibility of receiving and examining the declarations of all public officials, 
considering its financial and human resources capacity.   
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